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PRECAP: Kohler v. Keller Transport, Inc.; Westchester Surplus Lines
Insurance Company v. Keller Transport, Inc.: After a Confessed
Judgment, is an Insurer Entitled to a Reasonableness Hearing in the
Underlying Tort Action?
Kristen Zadick
Nos. DA 12-0600 and DA 14-0278
Montana Supreme Court
Oral Argument: Friday, September 11, 2015 at 10:00 AM in the Holiday
Inn Missoula Downtown, Missoula, Montana.
I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Does an insurer assume a duty to defend its insureds by voluntarily
defending its insureds? If so, does an insurer breach its assumed duty to
defend by withdrawing its defense prior to exhausting the policy limits?
Following a confessed judgment against its insureds, is an insurer
entitled to a hearing in the underlying action to review the
reasonableness the judgment? If so, may the insurer intervene in the
underlying action to contest the judgment?
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2008, a 6,000-gallon gasoline spill contaminated a
number of homes near Flathead Lake and forced the residents of the
effected homes (“Homeowners”) to evacuate.1 The two cases
consolidated for oral argument both arise from the spill.2 Prior to the
spill, Keller and Wagner entered into an agreement under which Wagner
hauled gasoline owned by Erickson Petroleum (“Erickson”) to Kalispell,
Montana. While hauling the gasoline on Montana Highway 35, the
tanker went off the road, spilling the gasoline.3 Soon after, Homeowners
filed suit against Keller, Wagner, and Erickson in Lake County district
court, alleging negligence for causing the accident.4 At the time of the
spill, Carolina Casualty Insurance Company (“Carolina”) provided
primary insurance, and Westchester Lines Insurance Company
(“Westchester”) provided excess insurance, to Keller and Wagner.5 The
Br. of Appellant 3–4, Feb. 4, 2013, No. DA 12-0600.
Order 2, July 22, 2015, Nos. DA 12-0600 and DA 14-0278.
3
Br. of Appellant 3–4, No. DA 12-0600.
4
Appellee’s Resp. Br. 5, Apr. 5, 2013, No. DA 12-0600.
5
Id.
1
2
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policies provided commercial automobile coverage and commercial
general liability coverage (“CGL”).6 Following the accident, Carolina
advanced payment for certain costs, but after exhausting its $1 million
commercial automobile limit, Carolina withdrew and tendered the
defense to Westchester.7 Westchester initially defended Keller and
Wagner but withdrew after exhausting its $4 million commercial
automobile limit.8
In August 2010, Carolina filed a declaratory judgment action in
the Missoula County district court seeking rulings that (1) Carolina did
not have a duty to defend Keller and Wagner in the tort action, (2)
Carolina was entitled to reimbursement of its defense from Westchester,
and (3) Carolina owed no coverage under the CGL policy.9 In late
August 2010, Homeowners made a settlement offer based on the
availability of CGL coverage, demanding $4 million from Westchester
and $1 million from Carolina. However, the insurers rejected the offer,
prompting Wagner and Keller to enter settlement negotiations with
Homeowners.10
Following Homeowners’ settlement with Erickson, Carolina and
Westchester moved to intervene in the tort action to review the
reasonableness of any judgments entered against its insureds.11 Before
the Lake County district court ruled on the motions to intervene,
Homeowners and Keller and Wagner settled their disputes through
confessed judgments.12 The judgments provided that Keller and Wagner
were jointly and severally liable for a $13 million judgment in
Homeowners’ favor, offset by the $3 million settlement between
Homeowners and Erickson.13 Homeowners agreed to seek recovery only
from the insurers, and Keller and Wagner assigned their claims to
Homeowners, allowing Homeowners to pursue any proceeds from Keller
and Wagner’s insurance policies.14
In February 2011, the Lake County district court stayed the
insurers’ motions to intervene pending the outcome of the insurance
coverage action in the Missoula County district court.15 In August 2012,
the Missoula County district court granted partial summary judgment
against the insurers, holding Westchester and Carolina breached their
duties to defend Keller and Wagner by withdrawing from the defense
prior to exhausting the CGL coverage.16 Following the Missoula County
Br. of Appellant 4, No. DA 12-0600.
Appellee’s Resp. Br. 5–6, No. DA 12-0600.
8
Id. at 6.
9
Order 2, Aug. 30, 2012, No. DV 09-1.
10
Appellee’s Resp. Br. 9, Apr. 7, 2015, No. DA 14-0278.
11
Order 2, Aug. 30, 2012, No. DV 09-1.
12
Appellee’s Resp. Br. 8, No. DA 12-0600.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 8–9.
15
Id. at 9.
16
Id. at 70, 74.
6
7
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district court’s ruling that Westchester breached its duty to defend Keller
and Wagner, the Lake County district court held Westchester’ motion to
intervene was rendered moot.17
Shortly thereafter, Carolina settled with Homeowners, leaving
claims against Westchester.18 The Missoula County district court
reviewed the confessed judgment and found it reasonable.19 Westchester
appealed the rulings of both the Lake County and Missoula County
district courts.
III. ARGUMENTS
A. Duty to defend and breach
In granting partial summary judgment to Homeowners, the
Missoula County district court determined Carolina and Westchester’s
policies provided additional CGL coverage in the tort action,20 and that
both Carolina and Westchester breached their duties to defend Keller and
Wagner by withdrawing from the defense prior to exhausting the CGL
limits.21 The court determined the policy language regarding a general
aggregate limit was ambiguous and interpreted the ambiguity in favor of
extending CGL coverage to the insureds.22 Further, the court held
Westchester’s assumption of Keller and Wagner’s defense imposed a
duty to continue the defense,23 and Westchester breached its duty by
withdrawing its defense prior to exhausting the CGL limits.24 Reasoning
that an insurer’s breach of its duty to defend makes the insurer liable for
“any settlement and judgment,”25 the court concluded Westchester’s
breach made it liable for the confessed judgment, despite the judgment
being in excess of the policy limits.26
1. Arguments
Appellant Westchester asserts it did not have a contractual duty
to defend Keller and Wagner because the insurance contract “expressly
provides that [Westchester has] no duty to defend.”27 Westchester further
argues the court erred in its conclusion that Westchester assumed a duty
to defend Keller and Wagner because the ruling ignores the terms of the
Br. of Appellant 8, Feb. 4, 2013, No. DA 12-0600.
Appellee’s Resp. Br. 3, Apr. 7, 2015, No. DA 14-0278.
19
Id. at 4.
20
Order 79, Aug. 9, 2012, No. DV 10-1133.
21
Id. at 70, 74.
22
Id. at 60–61(citing Mitchell v. State Farm Ins. Co., 68 P.3d 703, 709 (Mont. 2003)).
23
Id. at 74.
24
Id. at 79.
25
Id. at 61(citing Indep. Milk & Cream Co. v Aetna Life Ins. Co., 216 P. 1109, 1111 (Mont. 1923)).
26
Id. at 79.
27
Br. of Appellant 16, Jan. 5, 2015, No. DA 14-0278.
17
18
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policy providing for an “option” to associate with the defense and the
right to withdraw from the defense after exhausting the policy limits.28
Westchester argues a $4 million “general aggregate” provision
unambiguously refers to the total limits under the policy, making its
withdrawal after exhausting the $4 million limit proper.29 Westchester
contends its withdrawal did not amount to a breach because Keller and
Wagner’s defense was not prejudiced. Rather, Westchester and Carolina
paid every invoice submitted by the insureds.30
The Appellees respond that Westchester failed to exhaust the
excess policy limits before withdrawing from Keller and Wagner’s
defense31 and breached its duty to defend the insureds,32 making it liable
for the judgment.33 The Appellees assert that because the voluntary
assumption of a contractual duty creates a duty,34 once Westchester
chose to defend the insureds, it assumed a duty to continue the defense.35
To rebut Westchester’s argument that “general aggregate” refers to the
total limit available under the policy, the Appellees argue the term is
ambiguous because a policy endorsement contradicts Westchester’s
interpretation of the term.36 The endorsement provides that both the $4
million commercial automobile coverage and the $4 million CGL
coverage separately apply to each accident and payment for one accident
does not reduce the insurer’s liability for another accident.37 Arguing that
ambiguities in the insurance policy should be construed in favor of
extending coverage,38 the Appellees argue the provision should be
interpreted to extend CGL coverage to the insureds.39 Finally, while the
Appellees argue an insurer’s breach of its duty to defend does not require
a showing that the insured suffered prejudice, the Appellees contend
Wagner suffered prejudice because its attorney fees went unpaid for five
months after Westchester withdrew, preventing Wagner from retaining
qualified experts.40
2. Analysis
Whether Westchester had and breached a duty to defend Keller
and Wagner is a threshold issue. If Westchester did not have a duty to
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 23–24.
30
Id. at 31.
31
Appellee’s Resp. Br. 29, Apr. 7, 2015, No. DA 14-0278.
32
Id. at 34.
33
Id. at 39.
34
See Stewart v. Stand. Publ’g Co., 55 P.2d 694, 696 (Mont. 1936); Sult v. Scandrett, 178 P.2d 405,
406–07 (Mont. 1947).
35
Appellee’s Resp. Br. 29, No. DA 14-0278.
36
Id. at 15.
37
Id. at 14–15.
38
Id. at 13 (citing Mitchell, 68 P.3d at 709).
39
Id. at 16.
40
Id. at 45–46.
28
29
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defend, or it did not breach the duty, Westchester is not liable for the
confessed judgment. While the parties agree the policy provides for an
option to associate with the defense, the parties dispute whether
Westchester assumed a duty to defend the insureds. Although the
voluntary assumption of a contractual duty imposes such a duty,41 the
Court has not applied this rule to an insurer’s assumption of a defense.
However, to reach the remaining issues of the reasonableness of the
confessed judgment and Westchester’s intervention motion, the Court
may extend the rule and hold Westchester assumed a duty to continue the
defense. Even if the Court determines Westchester had a duty to defend,
the issues of Westchester’s breach and potential liability for the judgment
remain. The Court could find that Westchester’s policy language
unambiguously provides for a total $4 million limit under the policy,
which would make Westchester’s withdrawal after expending that
amount proper. However, to reach the issues of reasonableness and
Westchester’s intervention, the Court may find the “general aggregate”
provision is ambiguous, which would extend CGL coverage to Keller
and Wagner and make Westchester liable for a reasonable judgment
entered against its insureds.
B. Reasonableness Review
Although Westchester sought a review of the reasonableness of
the stipulated judgment in the Lake County court, the court did not reach
the reasonableness issue because it determined Westchester’s motion to
intervene was moot.42 However, the Missoula County district court
considered the reasonableness of the confessed judgment in the coverage
action.43 Although the Missoula County court notes Montana law “does
not impose a duty upon courts to review” a judgment where an insurer
breaches its duty to defend its insured,44 the court conducted a
reasonableness review because Westchester raised the reasonableness
issue in that action.45 Accordingly, the court reviewed Homeowners’ and
Keller and Wagner’s expert reports from the tort action, reasoning that
the proper measure of reasonableness is the record of the underlying
action.46 The court found the judgment to be reasonable, reasoning that a
jury could have awarded the amount based on the evidence presented in
the tort action.47
Stewart v. Stand. Publ’n Co., 55 P.2d 694, 696 (Mont. 1936); Sult v. Scandrett, 178 P.2d 405,406–
07 (Mont. 1947).
42
Order 6, Aug. 30, 2012, No. DV 09-1.
43
Order 40, Mar. 25, 2014, No. DV 10-1133.
44
Id. at 39 (quoting Nielsen v. TIG Ins. Co., 442 F.Supp.2d 972, 981 (D. Mont. 2006)).
45
Id. at 43.
46
Id. at 47–48.
47
Id. at 48.
41
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1. Arguments
Appellant Westchester argues the $13 million judgment merits a
reasonableness hearing in the tort action because parties to a confessed
judgment have little reason to set a reasonable amount of damages when
only the insurer’s money is at stake.48 Recognizing that the insurer bears
the duty to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the
reasonableness of the judgment,49 Westchester asserts the judgment is
unreasonable because it is “more than 43 times” the lost value of
Homeowners’ property, the restoration plan presents a risk of harm to the
environment and neighbors, and there is no evidence the plan would be
successful.50 Westchester further argues the Lake County district court
should conduct the reasonableness hearing in the tort action because that
court is familiar with the facts underlying the judgment and only that
court can modify the judgment.51
The Appellees respond that not only is Homeowners’ settlement
with Keller and Wagner reasonable, but the Missoula County district
court already conducted a reasonableness hearing.52 The Appellees
argue that while a breaching does not have a procedural due process
right to a reasonableness hearing, an insurer has a substantive due
process right to a hearing only when the insurer presents evidence that
creates a genuine issue of fact regarding the reasonableness of the
judgment.53 Even where an insurer meets that burden, however, the
district court conducting the hearing determines the nature and extent of
the hearing.54 The Appellees argue Westchester conducted discovery,
submitted expert reports, and argued at a reasonableness hearing in the
insurance coverage action, and is not entitled to an additional hearing in
the tort action.55 Although a subsequent Montana Supreme Court
decision required a reasonableness hearing to be held in the underlying
case,56 the Appellees argue that case is inapplicable because it involved
collusion between the entities entering into the confessed judgment.
Here, there are no allegations of collusion between Keller, Wagner, and
Homeowners; rather, the confessed judgment is based on expert
evidence. Westchester raised the reasonableness issue in the insurance
coverage action and participated in “extensive proceedings” on that
issue.57
Br. of Appellant 36-37, Jan. 5, 2015, No. DA 14-0278 (citing Tidyman’s Mgmt. Servs. Inc. v.
Davis, 330 P.3d 1139, 1153 (Mont. 2014).
49
Tidyman’s, 330 P.3d at 1154.
50
Br. of Appellant 37-39, No. DA 14-0278.
51
Id. at 35-36.
52
Appellee’s Resp. Br. 24, 39, Apr. 7, 2015, No. DA 14-0278.
53
Id. at 40 (citing Tidyman’s, 330 P.3d at 1154).
54
Id. (citing Abbey/Land, LLC v. Interstate Mech., Inc., 345 P.3d 1032, 1035 (Mont. 2015)).
55
Id. at 45–46.
56
Abbey/Land, 345 P.3d at 1035.
57
Id.
48
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2. Analysis
The reasonableness of the confessed judgment, and whether the
failure to hold a reasonableness hearing in the underlying tort action
resulted in error, will likely constitute the majority of the oral argument.
The parties dispute whether the hearing should be held in the underlying
tort action or the declaratory judgment action. Although both parties rely
on Tidyman’s to argue for and against a reasonableness hearing,
Tidyman’s does not address the proper court in which to conduct a
hearing. Further, although the court in Abbey/Land required a
reasonableness hearing in the underlying action, the Court may find
Abbey/Land is distinguishable because it involved collusion between the
parties entering the confessed judgment, and because Westchester
already litigated the reasonableness issue in the coverage action. Because
the Abbey/Land rule did not exist at the time of Westchester’s
reasonableness hearing, the Court may determine the failure to hold the
reasonableness review in the underlying tort action is harmless. Since the
court conducting the hearing determines the nature of the review,58 the
Court may hold the reasonableness hearing in the coverage proceeding
was adequate.
C. Intervention
Following the settlement between Homeowners and Keller and
Wagner, the Lake County district court stayed Westchester’s intervention
motion pending the Missoula County district court’s ruling on whether
Westchester had and breached a duty to defend Keller and Wagner.59
Reasoning that an insurer’s breach of its duty to defend makes the insurer
liable for any judgments against its insured,60 the Lake County district
court explained that if Westchester breached its duty to defend, the
motion to intervene to contest the judgment would become moot because
Westchester would be liable for the judgment.61 Conversely, if the
Missoula County district court determined Westchester did not breach its
duty to defend, but owed additional CGL coverage, the motion to
intervene to contest damages would become ripe.62 After the Missoula
County district court determined Westchester breached its duty to defend
by withdrawing from the defense of Keller and Wagner, the Lake County
district court accordingly held the motion to intervene was moot. 63
Id. at 1155.
Order 2, Aug. 30, 2012, No. DV 09-1.
60
See Farmers Union Mutual Ins. Co. v. Staples, 90 P.3d 381, 386 (Mont. 2004); Lee v. USAA
Casualty Ins. Co., 86 P.3d 562, 565 (Mont. 2004).
61
Order 5, No. DV 09-1.
62
Id.
63
Id.
58
59
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1. Arguments
Appellant Westchester contends an issue becomes moot only
when it ceases to exist and no longer presents an actual controversy.64
Westchester argues the Lake County district court erred in finding that
Westchester’s motion to intervene was moot because (1) the breach
ruling, as a partial summary judgment ruling, is not final and does not
prevent the Lake County district court from granting the motion; and (2)
even if the breach ruling were final, it would not render a reasonableness
hearing on damages moot.65 Accordingly, Westchester asserts it has a
valid interest in the tort action, and should be allowed to intervene,
because it is the only party that may be liable for the judgment.66
Further, the Lake County district court is better situated to decide the
reasonableness of the damages award, as opposed to the Missoula
County district court, because the Lake County district court entered the
judgment and has the power to modify the judgment.67
Responding to Westchester, the Appellees argue Westchester
fails to satisfy the requirements for intervention as a matter of right under
Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a).68 First, Westchester’s motion to
intervene is untimely because Westchester seeks intervention nearly two
years after the case was commenced and after Westchester knew of its
alleged interest in the case.69 Second, Westchester has no interest in the
tort action because its rights and responsibilities will be resolved in the
insurance coverage action.70 Third, Westchester’s interest is not impaired
by not being a party to the tort action because Westchester cannot be
required to pay the judgment absent a court order from the insurance
coverage proceeding.71 Additionally, Westchester is not entitled to
permissive intervention because it fails to satisfy the timeliness
requirement.72 The Appellees argue public policy considerations support
the denial of Westchester’s motion because intervention would allow
Westchester to interfere with the defense, unfairly restricting the insureds
and their independent counsel.73
2. Analysis
Br. of Appellant 17, Feb. 4, 2013, No. DA 12-0600 (quoting Med. Marijuana Growers Ass’n v.
Corrigan, 281 P.3d 210, 214 (Mont. 2012)).
65
Id. at 19.
66
Id. at 28–29.
67
Id. at 12–13.
68
Appellee’s Resp. Br. 14, Apr. 5, 2013, No. DA 12-0600.
69
Id. at 17–18.
70
Id. at 24–25.
71
Id. at 28.
72
Id. at 31.
73
Id. at 33.
64
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Because Westchester seeks to intervene in the tort action to
contest the reasonableness of the confessed judgment, the intervention
issue is contingent on Westchester’s right to a reasonableness hearing. If
the Court holds Westchester is not entitled to an additional hearing, the
Court will likely not decide this issue. Likewise, if the Court finds
Westchester did not have a duty to defend Keller and Wagner, or did not
breach a duty to defend, Westchester cannot be liable for the judgment,
and its motion to intervene in the tort action would be irrelevant.
Although the Appellees raise a valid question about the timeliness of
Westchester’s motion to intervene, the dispute likely comes down to
whether Westchester has an interest in the tort action. While Westchester
claims its interest relates to its potential liability for the judgment,
Westchester voluntarily withdrew from the defense of its insureds and
forfeited its right to control the insureds’ defense. Further, Westchester
participated in a separate coverage action to determine its liability for the
judgment and litigated the reasonableness of the judgment. Because
Westchester initiated and participated in the coverage action, the Court
may find Westchester already litigated the issues it now seeks to raise in
the tort action.

